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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OUTSOURCE RECEIVABLES ) Appeals Case No. 20050985-CA 
MANAGEMENT, ) Fifth District 
';) Court No. 050500513 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 
vs. ) 
IRENE C. RIGBY, ) 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of this case is vested with the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (j) , and 
pursuant to Rules 3 (a) and 4 (a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue 1. Defendant/Appellant has failed to marshal 
the evidence against the factual basis for the trial court's 
ruling. 
Issue 2. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it entered judgment against 
1 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Issue 3. Defendant/Appellant may not rely on 
evidence not made part of the record on appeal. 
Issue 4. Defendant/Appellant should be ordered to 
pay the reasonable attorney's fees and costs of 
Plaintiff/Appellee for filing this frivolous appeal. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. ProMax 
Development Corporation v. Matt son, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah 
App. 1997) . The appellant has a duty to "present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at [the hearing] which supports the very 
findings [he] resists." State of Utah v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, 
117. "If the marshaling requirement is not met, the appellate 
court has grounds to affirm the court's findings on that basis 
alone." Ibid. 
The District Court's legal conclusions are reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. State of Utah v. Clark, 2005 UT 
75, 518. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
General contract law requires that once the trial 
2 
court determines a valid contract exists, the contract must be 
enforced. "The only thing...that the courts are concerned with 
is to ascertain the intention of the parties to any contract, 
and, when this is ascertained, the duty to enforce such 
intention admits of no escape." Daly v. Old, 35 Utah 74, 99 
P. 460, 463 (Utah 1909), cited in Swenson v. Erickson, 2006 UT 
App 34, fll. 
Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1 (2) states: " Unless parties 
to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the 
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any 
money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum." 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
states: 
"(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in 
a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the 
court determines that a motion made or appeal taken 
under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, 
it shall award just damages, which may include single 
or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or 
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. 
The court may order that the damages be paid by the 
party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a 
frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is 
one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument 
to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An 
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for 
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any 
improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless 
3 
increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that 
will benefit only the party filing the appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal follows a trial held on September 2 6, 
2005, before the Honorable James L. Shumate, District Court 
Judge. The Defendant/Appellant objects to the court's entry 
of judgment against her as prayed in Plaintiff's Complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Zion Eye Institute provided medical services to 
Defendant/Appellant, Ms. Rigby, on various occasions before 
October 26, 2000. (Record on Appeal, page 2.) 
2. Ms. Rigby signed a form in which she agreed that 
she was "financially responsible for all charges incurred." 
(Record on Appeal page 4, copy included in Addendum.) Ms. 
Rigby has admitted that she signed this form (Record on Appeal 
page 8) . Ms. Rigby made some arguments at trial concerning the 
circumstances surrounding the signing of the contract, but the 
trier of fact concluded that the contract was validly and 
properly signed. 
3. Ms. Rigby became eligible for Medicare coverage 
in November, 1999. (Record on Appeal page 12, and page 42, 
Transcript page 6 line 24-25.) Ms. Rigby apparently believed 
4 
that her Medicare coverage could apply retroactively to cover 
charges incurred before her eligibility date of November 1, 
1999, but it did not. (Record on Appeal page 42, Transcript 
page 7 lines 1-6.) She also had various other insurance 
coverage during the periods of service. (Record on Appeal page 
42, Transcript page 6 lines 3 through 10; page 7, lines 14 
through 15.) 
4. Zion Eye Institute billed Ms. Rigby7s insurance 
companies, but a principal balance of $5,337.32 remains owing 
for her treatments. (Record on Appeal page 2; page 42, 
Transcript page 6 lines 3-12, 16-19.) Ms. Rigby provided no 
evidence at trial to dispute the accuracy of this balance. 
5. Zion Eye Institute subsequently assigned its 
claim to Outsource Receivables Management for collection. 
(Record on appeal page 2.) 
5. Ms. Rigby states in her brief at the bottom of 
page 1 that during the trial "Defendant stated that she 
believed that there were errors in the billing statement." 
However, this statement does not appear anywhere in the record 
on appeal or in the transcript of the hearing. Page 2 of the 
brief of Ms. Rigby outlines her claims of errors in the billing 
statement. None of these "errors" were presented to the Court 
5 
at the time of trial, nor were they a part of the record before 
the trial court. The Court therefore cannot consider these 
"errors" as facts in this appeal. The documents marked by Ms. 
Rigby as Exhibits 4 through 8 of her brief were not part of the 
record before the trial court; in fact, Exhibits 5, 6, and 7 
are specifically dated after the date of the trial on September 
26, 2005. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Defendant/Appellant has the duty to "present, 
in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at [the hearing] which supports the very 
findings [he] resists." State of Utah v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, 
117. "If the marshaling requirement is not met, the appellate 
court has grounds to affirm the court's findings on that basis 
alone." Ibid. She has failed to meet this burden, and thus 
the Court must assume that the factual findings relied upon by 
the trial court are supported by the record. 
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when 
it granted judgment against Defendant/Appellant. The Court 
found no reason to refuse to enforce the contract signed by Ms. 
Rigby, and she presented no evidence contradicting the amount 
claimed as owing by Plaintiff and its assignor, Zion Eye 
6 
Institute. 
3. Ms. Rigby cannot now bring in evidence which she 
did not present to the trial court in support of her appeal. 
This Court must rely on the information in the record on appeal 
in reviewing the judgment of the trial court. 
A. Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, this Court should order Ms. Rigby to pay 
damages to Plaintiff/Appellee for her frivolous appeal, which 
is not based upon any facts in evidence before the trial court, 
and which has no basis in existing law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT/APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO 
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE 
FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING. 
The Defendant/Appellant fails to meet the standard of 
appellate review to overturn the trial court's decision. She 
has a duty to "present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at [the hearing] 
which supports the very findings [he] resists." State of Utah 
v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, 117, quoting Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 
177, 100 P. 3d 1177. "If the marshaling requirement is not met, 
the appellate court has grounds to affirm the court's findings 
on that basis alone." State of Utah v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, 117.. 
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Ms. Rigby has not, in "comprehensive and fastidious order, 
[marshaled] every scrap of competent evidence introduced at 
trial which supports the very findings [he] resists." Moon v. 
Moon, 973 P. 2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 1999). Ms. Rigby has not 
even stated the facts in evidence at the trial which support 
her position; she certainly has not stated the fact which 
support the Court's ruling. Rather, she attempts to bring new 
evidence before this Court which was not presented to the trial 
court. Ms. Rigby has likewise failed to expose any "fatal 
flaw in the evidence" sufficient to overturn the trial court's 
findings. Moon at 437. Ms. Rigbyfs attempt to have this court 
reconsider the facts of the case runs counter to this Court's 
position that due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
ProMax Development Corporation v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 
(Utah App. 1997). "What appellants cannot do is merely re-
argue the factual case they presented in trial court." Chen 
v. Stewart, at 577. 
In cases such as this, where Ms. Rigby has not met 
her burden of marshaling the evidence, the Court has stated 
that it will ". . . [assume] that the record supports the findings 
of the trial court and [this Court] proceeds to a review of the 
8 
accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the 
application of that law to the case." Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 
P.2d 429, 432 (Utah App. 1994). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT ENTERED JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT/APPELLANT. 
The trial court relied on the existence of a contract 
signed by Ms. Rigby in granting judgment against her. Nothing 
in the evidence presented before the trial court suggested that 
the contract was not valid and enforceable. Ms. Rigby was 
given the opportunity to explain why the contract should not 
be enforced, but she presented no credible evidence challenging 
the contract. Further, Ms. Rigby presented no evidence at all 
at trial to dispute the amount claimed by Plaintiff/Appellee 
and its assignor. At page 10, line 22 and following of the 
transcript of the trial in this matter, Judge Shumate stated 
the amount of the claim, and on page 11, line 4 he then asked 
Ms. Rigby point-blank "You tell me why it is that you donft owe 
that." After asking Ms. Rigby two more times (on page 15, line 
9, and page 16, line 16) if there was anything else she wanted 
to tell him, Ms. Rigby provided no evidence to show that the 
amount of the claim was incorrect. The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in granting judgment as prayed, when Ms. 
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Rigby provided no evidence showing that she did not owe the 
amount claimed. 
III. DEFENDANT/APPELLANT MAY NOT RELY ON EVIDENCE 
NOT MADE PART OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL. 
Ms. Rigby made a choice not to request any documents 
or information from Plaintiff, Outsource, or its assignor, Zion 
Eye Institute, through the discovery process prior to the trial 
of this action. She provided no evidence to the trial court 
which would contradict the amount owed by her on the claim of 
Outsource and Zion Eye Institute. 
Following the trial, and in her filings with this 
Court, she has provided documents purporting to challenge the 
balance owed by Ms. Rigby to Outsource for the claim of Zion 
Eye Institute. 
In considering Ms. Rigbyrs appeal, this Court should 
not consider evidence which was not presented to the trial 
court. State of Utah v. Clark, 2005 UT 75 127, 29 (Utah 2005); 
Lovendahl v. Jordan School District, 2002 UT 130 551, 63 P.3d 
705 (Utah 2002), citing Robinson v. Tripco Inv. Inc., 2000 UT 
App 200 12 n.l, 21 P.3d 219 (Utah App. 2000) . The bulk of the 
information in Ms. Rigbyfs filing with this Court was not 
presented to the trial court. A review of the actual record 
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on appeal, and the transcript, clearly shows what information 
was (and was not) presented to the trial court. And it is 
obvious that any documents dated after the trial date of 
September 26, 2005, were not before the trial court at the time 
of trial. This Court should disregard all exhibits attached 
to Ms. Rigbyfs filing and any argument she makes based upon 
those exhibits, and instead rely only on the actual record. 
Ms. Rigby had the opportunity to present any evidence to the 
trial court that she wished; however, she cannot now be 
permitted to add to the record on appeal. Permitting her to 
rely on additional evidence would subvert this Court's stated 
position that "it is the trial court's role to assess witness 
credibility, given its advantaged position to observe testimony 
first hand...." ProMax Development Corp v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 
247, 255 (Utah App. 1997). 
While the trial court handled this trial in an 
informal manner, "This informality does not permit, however, 
the abridgement of basic constitutional provisions of due 
process such as the opportunity to know, cross-examine, explain 
or rebut evidence not introduced in open court." State of 
Utah, In the Interest of S.J., H.J., and S.J. 576 P.2d 1280, 
1283 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added). Ms. Rigby had a duty to 
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present to the trial court any evidence relevant to its ruling. 
Having failed to provide that evidence to the trial court, she 
cannot now expect this Court to reopen the case and consider 
additional evidence which she obtained after the trial. The 
evidence in the record on appeal supports the trial court's 
judgment award; no other evidence can or should be considered 
in reviewing that award. 
ISSUE 4. DEFENDANT/APPELLANT SHOULD BE ORDERED 
TO PAY THE REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS OF 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE FOR FILING THIS FRIVOLOUS APPEAL. 
Rule 33 (b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
defines a frivolous appeal as one not grounded in fact, not 
warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. 
Defendant/Appellant, Ms. Rigby, does not rely on existing law 
as a basis for her appeal, nor does she ask this Court to 
extend, modify, or reverse existing law. In fact, she cites 
no law at all in her filings herein. She relies solely upon 
facts as the basis for her appeal, and the facts she relies 
upon were not in evidence before the trial court. Her appeal 
is therefore not grounded in facts which were before the trial 
court. Ms. Rigby1s appeal meets every definition of a 
frivolous appeal. Plaintiff/Appellant therefore requests that 
12 
this Court order Ms. Rigby to pay damages for her frivolous 
appeal, by ordering her to pay costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees as authorized by Rule 33 (a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Rigby asks this Court to give her another bite at 
the apple, by submitting additional evidence which was not 
presented to the trial court. She makes no effort to challenge 
the ruling of the trial court based on the evidence which was 
available at the time of trial. Accordingly, the ruling of the 
trial court should be affirmed, and Ms. Rigby should be ordered 
to pay the costs and attorney's fees on appeal of the 
Plaintiff/Appellee, Outsource Receivables Management, for her 
frivolous appeal. 
DATED this Q] day of[_AA/_ , 2006 
JUDY mm BI 
Attorney for' the 
Plainyiff/Appellee 
Outsource Receivables Management 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Judy Dawn Barking, certify that on the 5> day of 
July, 2006, I served two copies of the attached Brief of the 
Plaintiff/Appellee upon Irene C. Rigby, Defendant/Appellant pro 
se, by mailing to her by first class mail with sufficient 
postage prepaid to the following address: 
Irene C. Rigby 
668 East 490 South 
Ivins, Utah 84738 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
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this Court order Ms. Rigby to pay damages for her frivolous 
appeal, by ordering her to pay costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees as authorized by Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Rigby asks this Court to give her another bite at 
the apple, by submitting additional evidence which was not 
presented to the trial court. She makes no effort to challenge 
the ruling of the trial court based on the evidence which was 
available at the time of trial. Accordingly, the ruling of the 
trial court should be affirmed, and Ms. Rigby should be ordered 
to pay the costs and attorney's fees on appeal of the 
Plaintiff/Appellee, Outsource Receivables Management, for her 
frivolous appeal. 
DATED this day of , 2006. 
JUDY DAWN BARKING 
Attorney for the 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
Outsource Receivables Management 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Judy Dawn Barking, certify that on the day of 
July, 2006, I served two copies of the attached Brief of the 
Plaintiff/Appellee upon Irene C. Rigby, Defendant/Appellant pro 
se, by mailing to her by first class mail with sufficient 
postage prepaid to the following address: 
Irene C. Rigby 
668 East 490 South 
Ivins, Utah 84738 
JUDY DAWN BARKING 





PLEASE READ CAREFULLY AND SIGN 
understand that I am financially responsible for al 
larges incurred. 
'equest that payment of authorized insurance benefits b6 
ade to The Zion Eye Institute for any services furnished 
me. 
authorize The Zion Eye Institute to release to the Healti 
are Financing Administration (HCFA) or my private 
urance company and its agents any information needec 
determine these benefits. 
\ n ya ,<? 
Patient's Signature / Date 
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JUDY DAWN BARKING, #0211 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Telephone: (801) 394-7704 
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IRENE C. RIGBY, 
SSN ending in 8242 
668 East 490 South 
Ivins, Utah 84738 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 050500513DC 
Judge: James L. Shumate 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial on September 
26, 2005, before the Honorable James L. Shumate, District Judge, 
presiding. Plaintiff was represented by its counsel, Judy Dawn 
Barking; Defendant was present, appearing pro se. The Court having 
heard evidence of the parties, and being fully advised in the 
premises, now enters judgment against the Defendant in the amount 
of: 
The principal sum of $5,337.37; 
Prejudgment Interest of $2,297.07; 
Accrued costs to date of judgment of $125.00; 
TOTAL JUDGMENT: $7,759.44 
with interest on the total judgment at the statutory contract rate 
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Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivofous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines 
that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which 
may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The 
court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse 
existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any 
improper purpose such as to harass, cause needess increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only 
the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own motion. A party may request damages 
under this rule only as part of the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's 
brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or 
both an order to show cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the 
allegations which form the basis of the damages and permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise 
ordered for good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall grant a hearing. 
http://www.utcoum.gov/rescmrces/rules/urap/33 htm 7/21/2006 
